REGIONAL DISPARITIES, PUBLIC POLICIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BRAZIL

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Marcelo Ladvocat
Vander Lucas

Resumo

Fiscal Federalism, the division of economic responsibilities between the central and local government, has been an ongoing debate. The few existing studies on Brazilian’s fiscal structure facing regional economic growth shows conflicting results. However fiscal decentralization can lead to a more efficient provision of local public goods and services to promote welfare state, citizen’s preferences and economic growth, Brazil's policymakers seem to have a different view. In a country where only three states in 26 hold 53% of Brazil’s PNB, disparities shows-up claiming to be solved. There are still some questions as to whether all regions can achieve real gains with greater autonomy. Decentralization may not solve all subnational entities problems, especially the issue of the poorer regions losing competitiveness about the richer regions, which increases regional disparities. In this way, more recent studies have focused on the different channels through which fiscal decentralization can affect the issue of disparities such as taxes and duties, the autonomy of spending and vertical fiscal imbalance. The present work investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralization, regional disparities and economic growth within 26 Brazilian’s states and Federal District, in the period 2001-2012. Attention was given to channels through which decentralization can affect inequality: human capital, vertical fiscal imbalance, population’s geographic concentration, and local taxes. The empirical analysis suggests that a decentralized fiscal structure can reduce regional disparities by implementing better government policies that favor local economic development.

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LADVOCAT, M.; LUCAS, V. REGIONAL DISPARITIES, PUBLIC POLICIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN BRAZIL. Revista Baru - Revista Brasileira de Assuntos Regionais e Urbanos, Goiânia, Brasil, v. 5, n. 2, p. 264–274, 2019. DOI: 10.18224/baru.v5i2.7687. Disponível em: https://seer.pucgoias.edu.br/index.php/baru/article/view/7687. Acesso em: 29 mar. 2024.
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Artigos / Articles
Biografia do Autor

Marcelo Ladvocat, Centro Educacional Alves Faria

Professor do Departamento de Economia, Centro Universitário Alves Faria – UNIALFA.

Vander Lucas, UnB

Professor do Departamento de Economia, Universidade de Brasília – UNB.

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